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ABSTRACT

Historically, the Soviet Union has had important
political interests in securing hegemony in Eastern Europe.
Control of this region has allowed the U.S.S.R. to maintain
a buffer zone as protection from Western influence.
The Soviets created Comecon in 1949 to aid in the
control of the bloc. Through Comecon ties, a relationship
built on Eastern European economic dependence on the Soviet
Union was formed.
This economic dependency was created and maintained
through the use of bilateral barter and inconvertibility of
currencies within Comecon. Although these methods proved to
be economically inefficient, the Soviets resisted any
attempts at reform. The Soviets feared that the economic
dependency of Eastern Europe would be lost through
multilateralism and convertibility. The preservation of
bilateralism and inconvertibility within Comecon therefore
ensured Soviet political domination of the region, an
important goal of Soviet policy in the Cold War era.
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Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance)
was created by the Soviets in 1949.
was political, not economic:
bloc.

Its ultimate purpose

consolidation of the Soviet

The Soviet aim was to strengthen its buffer zone

through increased economic ties with the Eastern European
nations.

This buffer zone, devised by Stalin, was to serve

as protection from Western invasion and influence.
Historically, the Soviet Union has had important
political interests in Eastern Europe.

Control of this

region has been a principle security goal of the Soviets.
This has been particularly significant in the post-World War
II era, characterized by the Cold War rivalry between the
Soviet Union and the United States.
The stated purpose of Comecon was the coordination of
the foreign trade and national plans of its members.

Intra-

Comecon trade had been based traditionally on
inconvertibility and resulting bilateral settlement as
established by the Soviets.

Such bilateralism forces a

country to settle trade with each of its trading partners on
an individual basis, resulting in a barter-like system of
exchange.

This method was maintained by the Soviets as it

served their political purpose of maintaining control of the
region through economic domination.
This type of trade has been characterized by economic

inefficiency.

Such methods have served as obstacles in the

productive functioning of Comecon and, as many argue, has
been a major factor in the dissolution of this organization
in early 1991.
Despite many Eastern European efforts to incorporate
multilateralism into the workings of Comecon throughout its
history, such reform efforts were sidetracked or halted by
the Soviets.

This reluctance to allow the introduction of

market mechanisms within Comecon, stemmed from the Soviet
Communist Party's long-standing political interests in
maintaining political and ideological control over both
Eastern Europe and its own country.
I.

Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe
In the post-World War II era, Soviet interest in

Eastern Europe largely stemmed from past Soviet
vulnerability to invasions through the Eastern European
nations, specifically through Czechoslovakia and Poland.1
As a result, one of Stalin's main concerns was to secure
control over this territory in order to prevent future
aggression against the Soviet Union.
A secondary interest in securing control of Eastern
Europe, was to limit nationality and religious conflicts in

1Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform:
Great Challenge (Cambridge:
Cambridge University
1988), 18.

The
Press

4
the region which' had threatened Soviet security in the
past.2 Such historical conflicts had involved Russia
throughout both its pre- and post-Revolutionary periods.
Examples particularly critical to Soviet national security
include the support given by Czechoslovakia’s first
president, Tomas Masaryk’s to the White Russian attempt to
overthrow Lenin and the open engagement of the Red Army in
1920 by the Poles.3
Consequently, Soviet influence in Eastern Europe was to
serve both to prevent Western expansion into Soviet
territory and to stabilize the area in order to minimize
regional conflicts and instability.4
Stalin and the Creation of Comecon
After World War II, the Soviet Union attempted to
extend its policy of national autarky and economic isolation
to the Soviet bloc as a whole.

Each country was aided in

developing foreign trade institutions based on the Soviet
model of state monopolies.
Following their refusal of Marshall Plan assistance
from the United States in 1947, the Soviets organized their
own Molotov Plan for the countries of Eastern Europe.

2Ibid.
3Ibid.
4Ibid, 19.
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Between 1947 and 1955, the economies of Eastern Europe
became tied to the Soviet economy through a series of
bilateral trade and scientific-technical cooperation
agreements.5
In addition, the Soviets presented the rouble as the
clearing currency for the bloc and extended trade credits to
the bloc states.6 Such credits were extended largely
according to political criteria, in that often they were
offered as a reward to nations for their loyalty to the
Soviet Union.7 These economic arrangements served to
establish strong economic ties between the Soviet Union and
the countries of Eastern Europe on a strictly bilateral
basis.

The bilateral ties among the European members of the

bloc were much weaker due to the smallness of their
economies and similarity in products created.
By modeling the Eastern European political systems
after the Soviet communist system, Stalin established
uniform and favorable conditions for the political
cohesiveness of the region.

Yet, in the customary sense,

this region was particularly unsuited for economic

5Glen Alden Smith, Soviet Foreign Trade: Organization,
Operations, and Policy, 1918-1971 (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1973), 27.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., 200.
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integration in that it lacked the precondition that
cooperation between states be on an equal footing.8 This
condition is necessary because the alternative, different
levels of development would call for a number of different
economic policies within one regional organization, which
would be extremely difficult to achieve.9
This inequality between the bloc states can be seen in
the diversity of development stages existing in the region.
One measure which illustrates this is the nations' varying
levels of per capita industrial output at the beginning of
Comecon.

In 1950, compared to the Soviet Union (the base of

100%), Bulgaria's per capita industrial output was 43%,
Czechoslovakia's was 14 3%, the GDR's was 13 6%, Poland's
stood at 70%, Romania's was 31%, and Hungary's was 78%.10
Despite the varied economic composition of the region,
Stalin still chose to create Comecon in an effort to propel
limited economic cooperation.

According to Adam Zwass, the

lack of the precondition of equality was actually in
Stalin's favor in that he never planned for Comecon to serve

8Adam Zwass, The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance:
The Thorny Path from Political to Economic Integration
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989), 14.
’ibid., 11.
10Ibid., 10.
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as a supranational economic authority.11 The last thing
Stalin wanted was to create an institution which had power
over to the Communist Party within the Soviet Union.
A more immediate impetus to Stalin*s creation of
Comecon arose when several Communist leaders in the Eastern
European nations announced their intention to create a
Balkan or Eastern European association independent of the
Soviet Union.

This challenge to Soviet hegemony can be seen

in a June 1947 speech by the Yugoslavian leader Tito.
Speaking to Western correspondents in Belgrade, Tito urged,
"the free Balkan peoples" to create "a strong monolithic
entity."12 Further, after visiting Bulgaria in November of
1947, and signing several pacts, Tito remarked that between
the two nations "cooperation was so close that the question
of federation will be a mere formality."13 Weeks later,
Kostov, the Bulgarian deputy Prime Minister, who was later
killed during the Stalinist purges, declared that events
would lead "in the near future to the union of all south
Slavs and to the creation of a common Slav country."14
11Ibid., 14.
12Royal Institute of International Affairs: Survey of
International Affairs, 1947-1948 (London, 1952), 175, quoted
by Ghita Ionescu, The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern
Europe (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 30.
13Ionescu, op. cit., 30.
14Ibid.

Additional evidence of this ambition appeared in
January of 1949 when Bulgaria's First Secretary Dimitrov
announced his vision of a federation made up of the Eastern
European nations of Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even Greece.

This

announcement received favorable responses from many Eastern
European communist leaders, particularly from the Romanian
Communist leaders and the Polish Communist Party.15
Another supporter of this vision was Rezso Nyers, a member
of the Hungarian Politburo, who publicly stated that such a
coalition would be much more successful without the Soviet
superpower included.16
The Kremlin viewed these efforts as zealous attempts to
form a South Slav or East European federation and gain
independence from the Soviet Union.

Even more threatening

was the potential of such an organization developing into a
rival force to counter Soviet influence in the region.

In

view of these fears, the Dimitrov incident finally snapped
the patience of the Soviets and an admonishing response was
published in Pravda on 28 January 1948.

This article made

clear that the Soviet Union saw absolutely no need for such

15Ibid. , 30-31.
16Zwass, 1989, op. cit., 13.

a federation and would not tolerate the creation of one.17
To avoid such a possibility, Stalin implemented
"people’s democracies", political systems modeled after the
Soviet State apparatus, in every bloc state in an effort to
create complete uniformity in the region.

In addition, each

people's democracy was ordered to amend its constitution to
clearly state its dependency on the Soviet Union for its
creation and continued existence.18
These East European ambitions for an independent
federation led to a deep distrust of Eastern European
motives on the part of Stalin.

Josef M. Van Brabant argues

that it was apparent at this time that Stalin greatly feared

that if the region was to fuse the various
economies and bolster mutual cooperation, it might
lead to an anti-Soviet bulwark. Indeed, joint
efforts to come to grips with the most urgent of
their common problems without the tutelage of the
USSR might have undermined the long-cherished
Soviet interest in exercising hegemony over
Eastern Europe.19
In an effort to safeguard against this, Stalin created
Comecon to develop and implement a regional economic policy,
with the Soviet Union playing the dominant role.

As argued

17Ionescu, op. cit., 31.
18Ibid. , 33.
T9Jozef M. Van Brabant, Socialist Economic Integration
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 25.
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earlier, inequality within Comecon was important to Stalin
in that he was strongly opposed to a regional economic
policy in which all countries were equals.

Equality could

not be accepted, because his main objective, in his own
words, was "to hold the satellites down, but at arm's
length.

Unreliable and westernized, they must not be

allowed too close."20
According to many experts this fear of East European
aspirations was also behind Stalin's opposition to outright
annexation of these countries.

One such proponent of this

argument, V. Dedijer, contends that Stalin had the power to
annex but lacked the motivation due to his strong distrust
of these countries.21
This distrust also appears to be behind Stalin's
encouragement of national autarkic policies for all the
Soviet bloc nations.

Despite his creation of Comecon,

Stalin encouraged, even forced, these countries to develop
according to a policy of national self-sufficiency.

Even

more paradoxical was the Soviets discouragement of increased
Comecon ties.22 As each nation pursued its own autarkic
20P .J .D . Wiles, The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1968), 311 quoted by Van Brabant, op. cit., 25.
21V. Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost- Memoirs of Yugoslavia,
1948-1953 (New York: Viking Press, 1979), 101 in Van Brabant,
op. cit., 25.
22Van Brabant, op. cit., 25.
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economic development, Comecon was basically a formality for
its first few years, despite the grand intentions
established in its charter.
Khrushchev and the Reactivation of Comecon
In the late 1950s, Khrushchev expanded the role of
Comecon in order to implement greater socialist integration;
something he saw as very necessary at the time.

This belief

stemmed, in part, from the formation of the rival European
Economic Community in 1958 and from the growing realization
that autarkic development was wasteful and inefficient.
More importantly, Khrushchev saw Comecon in the same way he
viewed the Warsaw Pact, as a forum through which to maintain
Soviet control of Eastern Europe, especially following the
attempted revolutions in Hungary and Poland in 1956.23
The reactivation of Comecon was a shrewd effort by
Khrushchev to bind each individual state economically to the
Soviet Union to create a situation of dependence.

This was

especially important in that these nations were increasingly
becoming divided both politically and ideologically.
Economic leverage, through a system of bilateral
dependencies on Moscow, would effectively allow the Soviets
greater political dominance over Eastern Europe.
[E]conomic pressure was exerted by exploiting
23J. F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 1988), 146.
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Eastern Europe's dependence upon Soviet raw
materials and energy— the Soviets provided trade
benefits as rewards for following Soviet policy
prescriptions and withheld supplies to punish
defiance of Soviet preferences.24
The Soviet use of economic leverage can be seen clearly
in the case of Poland.

Following the Soviet suppression of

the Polish October, a near-revolution in 1956, the Poles
still showed considerable interest in foreign aid,
particularly American aid.

Also, Poland was attempting to

shift increased exports, especially its chief export coal,
to the Western nations.25
As a result of the economic agreements and
specialization provisions produced at the 1958 conference
which revived Comecon, Soviet-Polish economic relations
intensified significantly.

In 1956, these transactions

amounted to 2,562 million roubles which then grew to 2,747
million rubles in 1959.26 This large trade volume, in
comparison, made the American loan to Poland in 1957 of $94
million appear negligible, even with the exchange rate taken

24Anne
Henderson,
"New
Realities
in
Eastern
Europe:
Challenges for Russia and the West," in New Thinking and Old
Realities, eds.
Michael T. Clark and Simon Serfaty,
(Washington, DC: Seven Locks Press), 36.
25Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and
Conflict (Cambridge University Press: Harvard University
Press, 1967), 287.
26Ibid. , 288.
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into account.27
Also important was the fact that Poland was becoming
increasingly dependent on such trade, not only because of
its large volume, but also because of its composition.
Soviet exports supplied Poland with the majority of its
needed imports of natural resources, something Poland was
sorely lacking.

For instance, in 1957 Poland was dependent

on the U.S.S.R. for 100% of its oil supplies, 70% of its
iron ore, 78% of its nickel, and 67% of its cotton.28 Even
more important, almost half of the Polish exports to the
U.S.S.R. in 1957 consisted of Polish machinery and
industrial goods, which represented about one half of total
Polish machine exports.29 These important Soviet-Polish
economic links, established through Comecon agreements, had
important and far-reaching effects on Poland.

Polish

leaders could not ignore the political implications of their
economic dependence on Comecon ties and more specifically,
on the Soviet Union as supplier of raw materials.
Through the reactivation of Comecon, Khrushchev also
hoped to make these economic ties of dependency more
equitable than earlier Stalinist Comecon ties based on

27Ibid.
28Ibid., 288-289.
^Ibld.. 289.
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exploitation of Eastern Europe.

During Stalin’s reign

"Moscow extracted $10-20 billion in reparations,
administered unequal joint-stock companies to exploit local
resources, and manipulated trade agreements to its
advantage" in its dealings with the bloc.30
Khrushchev's move to improve the Soviet-Eastern
European economic relationship was motivated by his desire
to achieve a period of detente with the West, to allow the
Soviets time to catch up to American economic and military
superiority.31

For detente to succeed the Soviets needed

to improve their image in the international arena and an
important part of this was to improve Soviet-East European
relations.

Improvements in economic relations were

attempted by Khrushchev by the establishment of more equal
and flexible intra-Comecon ties.32
To enhance the legitimacy of Comecon, the exploitative
economic ties were replaced by the extension of Soviet
economic support to the Eastern bloc nations.

Also, the

Soviets attempted to create the facade of more diplomatic

30Jonathan R. Adelman and Deborah Anne Palmieri, The Dynamics
of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1989),
159.
31Ibid., 151.
32Ibid., 157.
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cooperation in Comecon decision-making and activities.33
To offset damage done to Soviet-East European relations
resulting from the 1956 crises in Hungary and Poland,
Khrushchev attempted to improve economic relations even
further.

Intra-Comecon trade and activities were expanded

with terms of trade shifting dramatically in the East
European countries' favor.
J.F. Brown argues, "[t]he 1956 crises and their
aftermath cost Moscow several billion dollars in loans
extended to distressed regimes and the cancellation of old
debts."34 Although these changes established a more
equitable economic order in the Soviet bloc, and thereby
allowed the Soviets to maintain influence in the region,
this was at a very high cost to the Soviets.

Although these

new ties were costly, Khrushchev saw them as politically
necessary.

They were apparently successful in that further

crises in the bloc during Khrushchev's tenure were
avoided.35
Comecon Under Brezhnev
Similar to Khrushchev's handling of Eastern Europe,
Brezhnev attempted to avoid direct military force and
33Brown, op. cit., 448.
34Ibid., 159.
35Ibid.

instead tried to use economic, political and cultural ties
to maintain influence in the bloc.

This indirect method was

used to repair damage done to the Soviet international image
by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.

It attempted to

use new and less costly bases of control in Eastern Europe
as opposed to interventionist methods utilizing military
force.36 Toward this end, Brezhnev used a strategy based
on Soviet subsidization of Eastern Europe which actually
turned out to be quite costly economically but avoided the
negative effects on the Soviet international image
associated with direct intervention.
During the 1970s, this subsidization of Eastern Europe
cost the Soviet Union tens of billions of dollars.37 One
study estimates subsidization to have risen from less than
$250 million in the early 1960s to more than $10 billion per
year in the early 1980s.38 This large increase was due
primarily to the rapid rise in the world market price of oil
after 1973, while the price of Soviet oil and natural
resources sold to the Eastern European nations increased at
36Morris Bornstein and Daniel R. Fusfeld, The Soviet Economy:
A Book of Readings (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
1970), 193.
37Ibid.
38Michael Marrese and Jan Vanous, Soviet Subsidization of Trade
with Eastern Europe:
A Soviet Perspective (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Institute of International Studies,
1983) cited in Henderson, op. cit., 36.
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a much slower pace.39
An additional part of Brezhnev's strategy to improve
Soviet-Eastern European economic relations was to allow
greater economic experimentation in the Eastern bloc
nations.

By advocating such experimentation the Soviets

hoped to gain political support from regimes appreciative of
less rigid Soviet control.

Also, if such experiments were

successful, the region would become less of a drain on the
Soviet economy.40
Brezhnev, like the Soviet leaders before him, also used
Comecon ties as economic leverage to achieve Soviet
political interests in Eastern Europe.

This can be seen in

the interesting fact that only the most independent-minded
country in the region, Romania, which opposed the
Czechoslovakin invasion in 1968, did not receive a net
subsidy from the Soviets in the 1970s.41

Also, immediately

following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Moscow delayed
wheat shipments in order to secure its political
compliance.42

Another example is Brezhnev's refusal to

sell oil to Romania during the shortage of the 1980s.
39Henderson, op. cit., 36.
40Adelman and Palmieri, op. cit., 193.
41Ibid. , 90.
42Ibid.

This
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was probably a direct consequence of Romanian leader
Ceausescu's continuous defiance of Moscow.43 Since the
times of the Czechoslovakian invasion and the announcement
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Ceausescu had built up his
military to enable it to conduct guerilla warfare.

This

clearly was done to discourage a possible Soviet
intervention. Ceausescu also strengthened Romania's
political and economic ties to the West.44
As illustrated, Comecon historically was used by Soviet
leaders as an economic tool to achieve political purposes.
Benefits and subsidies of intra-Comecon trade, such as lower
than world prices on Soviet goods and resources, were
extended to the Eastern European nations largely according
to political loyalty.

In this sense, Comecon countries

following strict Soviet policy lines received increased
trade benefits, while countries deviating from Soviet
policies were punished economically with the loss of trade
benefits.
II.

Functions
Such leverage could only be achieved through the

establishment of Eastern Europe's economic dependency on the
Soviet Union.

To ensure such a dependent relationship,

43Ibid., 91.
44Adelman and Palmieri, op. cit., 289.
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certain practices and procedures were needed within the
context of Comecon activities.

This compelled the Soviets

to set up and maintain practices within Comecon that would
ensure this aim.
To generate maximum control of the Eastern bloc
economies and ensure dependency, Comecon was set up by the
Soviets to coordinate the national economic plans of its
members and to coordinate and direct foreign trade both
within and outside the bloc.45 The Comecon Council served
to construct a master plan of the total foreign trade
activity of Comecon as a whole. All individual national
plans and agreements had to be approved by the Council,
according to the requirements of the master plan, before
they could be put into operation.46

In the construction of

the master plan, top priority was given to the needs and
requirements of the Soviet Union as the dominant nation in
the Council.47

In this sense, Comecon planning was largely

guided and controlled by Soviet interests.
Through the establishment of the Soviet Union as the
dominant member of the Comecon Council, it achieved a high
level of control over the bloc.

45Smith, op. cit., 205.
‘'‘ibid., 206.
47Ibid.

Not only was it able to
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retain a large degree of control over its own foreign trade,
the U.S.S.R. also gained an influential role in the foreign
trade relations of the Eastern European nations.48
The inconvertibility of Comecon currencies also enabled
the Soviets to ensure control of the bloc was the
inconvertibility of Comecon currencies.

Such

inconvertibility isolated the Eastern bloc economies from
trade with the capitalist West and restricted Western
influence in the bloc.

In addition, this lack of trade with

the West avoided the possibility of economic dependency on
Western supplies which could seriously endanger the Soviet
status in the Cold War.

Because inconvertibility was also

practiced within Comecon it limited the transferability, let
alone convertibility, of currencies between its members.
This intra-Comecon inconvertibility enabled the Soviets to
preserve bilateralism and the economic dependency it
generated.
Another element which preserved Soviet control of the
bloc was a system of uncoordinated exchange rates for the
Comecon nations.

This method did not allow for the

evaluation of trade according to comparative price
advantages across member nations and therefore isolated the
price systems within countries from the influence of other

48Ibid., 207.

21

countries' prices for the same goods.

This allowed Soviet

leaders to maintain complete control over the pricing system
and the foreign trade transactions within the Soviet economy
without influence from Eastern European prices.49
Since its beginnings, intra-Comecon trade was conducted
through bilateral agreements, as instituted by the
Soviets.50 As a result of inconvertibility within the
bloc, this system consisted of barter trade in which each
country attempted to balance its trade with each of the
other nations and not with the bloc as a whole.

This

practice of bilateral barter established a pattern in which
the foreign trade of each of the European Comecon nations
was dominated by links to the Soviet economy.

This resulted

from the fact that the U.S.S.R. had the largest economy and
was richly endowed with natural resources urgently needed by
the smaller nations.
Closer dependence, stemming from increased bilateral
ties between the Soviet Union and the members of its bloc,
allowed the Soviets greater political and ideological
control over each nation within the region.51

Such

49Sandor Ausch, Theory and Practice of CMEA Cooperation, trans.
J. Racz (Budapest, Hungary: Akademiai Kiado, 1972), 165,.
50Marie Lavigne, The Socialist Economies of the Soviet Union
and Europe (White Plains, NY: International Arts and Science
Press, Inc., 1974), 309.
51Brown, op. cit., 448.
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dependency not only assured the Soviets of political control
of the region, but also served to prevent the development of
strong ties between the Eastern European nations
themselves.52
In establishing Comecon trade and activities on the
basis of bilateralism and inconvertibility, Zwass notes,
the Soviet CMEA experts never showed any
enthusiasm for mature monetary relations. They
were quite well aware of the difficulties
attendant on bilateralism, but considered them the
lesser evil compared with multilateral trade free
of quotas. Their centrally administered economy
with its inherent monopoly on foreign trade and
foreign exchange had after all been in operation
for a quarter of a century more than in the other
Eastern countries.53
The Soviets historically have held a strong belief in
the importance of the economy being centrally planned, with
political power as the controlling force.

They felt that

their economy was much more controllable under the guidance
of the Party, without the interference of "anonymous
economic mechanisms" contained within the capitalist
economies.54 Toward this goal, the Soviets clearly
favored, both domestically and in intra-Comecon trade, a
quota-based foreign trade, with products expressed in

52Henry Wilcox Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of
Integration (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1972), 35.
53Zwass, 1989, op. cit., 42.
54Ibid.
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physical units, over trade expressed in variable and
abstract monetary values.55
The Soviets viewed convertibility as "an alien
capitalist concept" which would disturb the functionings of
the central plans on which the Soviet economy was based.56
Foreign trade was to serve merely as a channel for supply in
order to support the plan.

Comparative cost advantage

evaluation was not important to this function.

Bilateral

barter served this function, without allowing foreign trade
to adversely affect the central plan.57
Economic Inefficiencies Resulting From Comecon Functions
Although this system served Soviet political purposes
by securing Soviet economic domination of the bloc, its
methods were significant factors aiding in the collapse of
Comecon.

Many experts contend such methods hindered intra-

Comecon trade and reduced it to essentially an inefficient
system of bilateral barter.
Inconvertibility within Comecon made little economic
sense.

This practice resulted in a condition where money

could not be used for business transactions or as a basis

55Ibid.
56Ibid. , 19.
57Ibid.

24
for the development of effective credit relations.58
Instead, the bloc currency, the transferable rouble (TR),
was used solely as a collective accounting unit.
Consequently, intra-Comecon credit merely served as a
technical instrument to achieve trade settlements.59
Largely as a result of the inconvertibility of the
Comecon currencies, bilateral barter was the main form of
trade between its members.

Although bilateralism reduced

foreign distortions on the internal economic plan of the
socialist economies, it was extremely inefficient.
Bilateral barter limited the volume of intra-Comecon trade
due to its strict requirement for equal units of trade
between two partners.
At the urging of the Soviets in 1956, bilateral barter
became based on long-term agreements instead of previously
used annual agreements.

This not only retained the

inefficiency of bilateralism, but also encouraged lowquality production due to its long-term nature.60 This
latter point stems from the fact that long-term agreements
allowed enterprises to avoid upgrading the quality of their

58Adam Zwass, Money, Banking, and Credit in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe (White Plains, NY:
M.E. Sharpe, 1979),
160-161.
59Ibid. , 161.
60Ibid. , 310.

25

products due to guaranteed, predetermined prices from their
Comecon trading partners.

In addition, bilateral barter,

with its uncoordinated price and exchange systems, severely
limited the exposure of the Comecon members to international
competition and resulted in the failure of its national
enterprises to produce competitive products for world
markets.
This system forced Comecon nations to achieve bilateral
trade balances with each individual Comecon country rather
than with the bloc as a whole.

This arrangement rested on

the principle of annual equality of supply of goods and
payments between each pair of countries.

If there existed

any disequilibrium between two Comecon nations, the debtor
nation technically had to supply additional goods to the
other nation the next year equivalent to the debt.

The

ability to supply additional goods the next year was
extremely difficult for a debtor nation, especially if it
was indebted to more than one nation.

As a result, this

clearing method served as a persistent hinderance to further
trade on the part of the debtor nations and served to impede
any further expansion of intra-Comecon trade.

Subsequently,

this led to a very rigid system whereby debtor nations could
never escape their predicament and creditor nations were not
financially rewarded.
III.

Soviet Resistance to Market-Based Reform

26

In an effort to eliminate the problems associated with
bilateral clearing, Comecon initiated a multilateral
clearing system on which to base trade settlements in 1963.
The International Bank for Economic Cooperation (IBEC) was
created to achieve this and the transferable rouble (TR) was
introduced as a monetary unit in which payments were to be
settled between Comecon nations.

Although this currency was

transferable between Comecon member nations, it was not
convertible outside or even within the Soviet bloc.

This

meant that surplus TRs could not be used in exchange for
foreign currencies outside the bloc.

In addition, a Comecon

nation could not use surplus TRs from a trade surplus with
one Comecon nation to balance a trade deficit with another
Comecon member.61
The introduction of the TR merely served as a
psychological ploy by the Soviets to appease those Eastern
European nations calling for financial reform.

It served no

actual purpose and did nothing to facilitate intra-Comecon
trade.

Trade payments between the socialist nations were

still based on inefficient bilateral exchange agreements.62
In 1969, the possibility of introducing limited
convertibility was discussed at the Twenty-third Session of
61,,Comecon:
An Idea Whose Time Has Gone,” The Economist 13
January 1990, 46.
62Lavigne, op. cit. , 314.
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the Council.

Although regional convertibility was

considered here, the Soviets declared that the possibility
of the TR being replaced by gold or a foreign currency was
out of the question.63
This strong resistance to even limited convertibility
arose from the Soviet fear that it would lead to the
dissolution of Comecon, as the European Payments Union had
been dissolved.64 The European Payments Union had been
founded in 1950 by fifteen Western European nations and
endowed with working capital by the United States.

Its

basic purpose had been to reinstate multilateralism in
Western Europe following World War II.

After it had

achieved currency convertibility and some degree of
multilateralism for its members, it had no further use and
was quickly disbanded.65
Stalin certainly did not want a similar fate to befall
Comecon after achieving even limited convertibility, since
he needed Comecon as a tool to aid in the control of Eastern
Europe.

In addition, Stalin saw limited convertibility

within Comecon as a first step toward full convertibility
which would certainly reduce Eastern Europe*s dependency on

63Ibid. , 315.
‘“ibid.
65Zwass, 1989, op. cit., 19.
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Soviet economic links and increase Eastern ties to the West.
Although another attempt for the creation of a
multilateral settlement system was included in the Comecon
Comprehensive Program of 1971, actual implementation was
stalled by the Soviets.

Section 7 of the 1971 Program

discussed possible improvements in currency-financial
relations and Article 9 of this document included plans for
the development and implementation of methods to expand the
use of the TR for multilateral settlements by 1973 .66 Also
contained within the Program was the idea of mutual
convertibility of the TR and other Comecon currencies, which
was foreseen by 1973 through IBEC channels.67
Although the Soviets had participated in the creation
of the Program and agreed to its provisions, their
traditional aversion to such reforms ensured that no
progress toward these Program goals would be attained by
1973.

Since this time no progress has been made either.

The TR never achieved convertibility both within the bloc
and outside Comecon.
During the creation and adoption of the 197 3 Program,
the Soviets had shown mere public support for

^Franklyn D. Holzman, The Economics of Soviet Bloc Trade and
Finance (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 156-157.
67Ibid. , 157.
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convertibility, while the reigning domestic opinion within
the U.S.S.R. considered the TR to serve all of its purposes.
The common Soviet view in 197 3 was expressed by Soviet
Finance Minister, V.F. Garbuzov.

He stated that the TR

"performs all the basic functions of an international
socialist currency:

measure of value, means of payment,

means of accumulation."68
The late 19 60s saw a Hungarian movement for both
domestic market-based reforms and parallel Comecon reforms,
including decentralization and convertibility.

Because the

Soviets feared the loss of power that could come with such
reforms they suppressed this movement within Comecon.

As a

further precaution they also attempted to limit the domestic
reform movement within Hungary.
By suppressing this movement for convertibility, the
Soviets hoped to avoid increased ties between the Eastern
European states and also between these nations and the West.
Such ties could reduce the economic dependency of the
Eastern European nations on the Soviet Union and even
provide them with a possible escape route out of dependent
Comecon relations.

An additional motivation for suppression

of this movement was the possibility of Comecon reform

68V.F. Garbuzov, "The Development of Currency and Financial
Relations of Comecon Member Nations," Soviet and East European
Foreign Trade (Summer 1973), quoted in Holzman, op. cit., 157.
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encouraging subsequent domestic reform movements within the
U.S.S.R.69
At the 1969 Twenty-second Council Session, the Soviet
Comecon Secretary, Nikolai Fadeyev, announced an agreement
recognizing the need for some type of convertibility within
the context of Comecon.

Although initially appearing to

support this fully, Fadeyev later argued for the absolute
necessity of gradual implementation of this reform.70

In

the end little progress was made in the direction of even
limited convertibility due to Soviet stalling on the issue.
Although the Soviets had agreed initially to this reform,
they later refused to allow its implementation.

They had

supported the reform only in an effort to avoid resentment
from the reformist-minded nations, yet they never planned to
allow such a reform to be instituted.

This deceit channeled

the resentment of the reformist-minded nations toward the
openly anti-reformist nations, specifically the GDR, and
also served to create divisions among the European
nations.71
The Soviets did realize the inefficiency associated
with Comecon relations and recognized the need for reform,

69Schaefer, op. cit., 7.
70Ibid., 40.
71Ibid. , 55.
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but they argued that such inefficiency could be solved
through operational level adjustments rather than by major
institutional reforms, such as convertibility.

They felt

that reforms toward socialist integration in the areas of
production, investment, and scientific-technical research
were the necessary solutions for Comecon stagnation and
inefficiency.72
While the Soviet Union stressed the need for scientific
and technical progress within Comecon, it focused little
attention on the need for improved intra-bloc trade.

This

appears to stem from the historical significance Soviet
leaders placed on the global competition between socialism
and capitalism, especially in the area of scientific and
technical progress.73
Increased economic ties between the Soviet bloc and the
Western nations, particularly West Germany, in the early
1970s, motivated the Soviet Union to call for increased
socialist integration within Comecon.

This Eastern European

turn to Western trade and loan agreements, primarily by the
GDR, was especially threatening to the Soviet Union in light
of the anti-Soviet feelings in this region prevailing

72Ibid. , 81.
^Ibid.
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following the Czechoslovakian invasion.74
Subsequently, efforts were initiated by the Soviets
toward greater integration within Comecon.

These efforts

were solely fixed on specific cooperative endeavors.

In

fact, any proposals by Comecon members which introduced the
combination of traditional planning development methods and
any type of market relations processes were rejected by the
Soviets.75
At a meeting of Comecon's Permanent Economic Committee
in May of 197 0, no progress was made in the debate over
reform of the financial systems of Comecon, including the
possibility of convertibility.

Here it was argued, most

strongly by Hungary and Poland, that a developed currency
mechanism was necessary in light of the ineffectiveness of
Comecon's bilateral trade.

These nations also felt that

such currency reform within Comecon was necessary in order
to support their domestic reform efforts.76
Others, notably the Soviet Union, argued that
convertibility was not a feasible idea.

The Soviets

believed that convertibility and other financial reforrs
would require more plan-like coordination of the market
74Ibid., 128.
^Ibid.
76Ibid. , 123.
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forces of supply and demand.

This, in turn, would create a

situation in Comecon of dependency on the capitalist
world.77
In July of 1971, the Twenty-fifth Council Session
endorsed the "Complex Program of the Continued Deepening and
Improvement of Cooperation and of the Development of
Socialist Economic Integration."

This established agreed-

upon plans for the implementation of intra-bloc
convertibility by 1973.

Additionally, the goal of

eventually using the TR for transactions outside of Comecon
was presented.
As with previous reform attempts, the Soviets initially
appeared to support fully all the provisions and plans
contained within the 197 3 Comecon Integration Program.

They

saw it as a firm commitment in the socialist movement toward
political and ideological, as well as, economic
integration.78 Such integration was considered by the
Soviets to be the "logical continuation of the close and
all-round" cooperation of the past.79 Because the overall
plan worked toward the major Soviet interest of improved
integration of planning, the U.S.S.R. endorsed it fully.

^Ibid., 143.
78Ibid. , 182.
^Pravda, 8 August 1971, quoted in Schaefer, op. cit., 182.
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Schaefer notes,
Thus even those aspects which had not received
high priority in the USSR, such as financial
reform and the development of the initiative of
enterprises and associations, were dully
supported.80
Yet, ultimate Soviet reluctance to implement reforms it had
initially supported was again evident.

During later

discussions centering on financial reform, including the
issue of convertibility, the Soviets contended that such
changes could only be considered after a number of
substantial planning improvements had been implemented
within Comecon.

This view included a Soviet argument that

the extensive development of multilateral
coordination of plans and of production
specialization and cooperation and the improvement
of the organization of foreign trade links will
create the preconditions for the extension of
multilateral accounting and multilateral balancing
of payments effected in transferable roubles.81
The Soviets further contended that anything less than
an extremely gradual implementation of convertibility would
be unsuccessful.

Their argument claimed that

under socialist conditions convertibility cannot
operate on the basis of free market relations
and cannot function in the manner of the so-called
freely convertible capitalist currencies.... The
introduction of currency convertibility
presupposes simultaneously solving a number of
complex problems... problems determined by
80Schaefer, op. cit., 183.
81Ibid.
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economic and organization preconditions....82
The possibility of convertibility with the West was
also strongly opposed by the Soviets at this time, although
they originally had agreed to the provision contained in the
Integration Program calling for eventual convertibility
outside of Comecon.

According to the Soviet Minister of

Finance, "any possibility of convertibility with the West,
even for the transferable ruble, which would involve Western
currencies in intra-Comecon trade," was out of the
question.83
By initially accepting and supporting the demands for
market-based reforms within Comecon the Soviets avoided
incurring resentment from the Eastern European reformist
nations.

Yet they later sabotaged any efforts to implement

such reforms that would lead to a loss in their economic
power over the region.

By rejecting all Comecon reform

efforts involving market mechanisms, the Soviet Union was
also rejecting any progress toward real integration of the
Comecon economies and efficient trading methods.

This

stance illustrates the Soviet preference for inefficient
economic methods within Comecon for the sake of Soviet

82Yu. Lonstantinov in Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,
1971, quoted in Schaefer, op. cit., 183.

48, November

83V. Garbuzov in Izvestia, 11 September 1971, quoted in
Schaefer, op. cit., 184.
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political control rather than a more economically efficient
Comecon through the use of convertibility and
multilateral ism.84
During the 1970s and 198 0s, the introduction of market
mechanisms into Comecon was discussed even more
enthusiastically than in previous times.

These discussions

were primarily at the urging of Hungary and Poland.

These

nations advocated reform programs which included
convertibility of the rouble, along with changes such as
decentralization, and price reforms.85 Such changes were
necessary to support domestic reform efforts such as
Hungary's New Economic Mechanism program.

Yet, as with

previous attempts, these reform efforts were terminated by
the Soviets since they were incompatible with their
political objectives.86
IV.

Gorbachev's Era of Reform
After coming to power in 1985, First Secretary Mikhail

Gorbachev's main objective was to reform the ailing Soviet
Union.

A primary component of his reform movement was his

program of perestroika, (restructuring), aimed at rescuing
the failing Soviet economy.

^Brown, op. cit., 148.
85Ibid. , 153.
^Ibid.

Perestroika included five major
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elements directed at improving the Soviet socialist system.
These included programs aimed at decentralization, the selffinancing of enterprises, a reformed price system, increased
private enterprise, and democratization.87
For perestroika to succeed the Soviets needed Western
credit and technology.

To gain aid from the West the Soviet

Union had to improve its international image.

An important

step toward a more conducive international environment to
bolster Soviet economic recovery was the improvement of
Soviet-Eastern bloc relations.
To improve intra-bloc relations Gorbachev encouraged
increased economic independence for the Eastern European
nations and the implementation of national economic reform
within these countries.88 Not only would this improve the
Soviet image in the eyes of the West, but by motivating the
region to become more economically efficient, it would
become less of a burden on the Soviet economy.
Through the encouragement of both economic and
political reform in the region, Gorbachev allowed the
socialist states to practice self-determination.

Under this

new Soviet policy, remarkable and unprecedented changes took
place in the bloc during the democratic revolution in the
87Daniel Ford, "Rebirth of a Nation," New Yorker 28 March
1988, 74-75.
^Brown, op. cit., 239.
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fall of 1989.
At that time, two of the bloc nations, Hungary and
Poland underwent radical domestic reforms.

Both countries

aimed at rapid transitions to market economies in hopes of
saving their ailing economies.

Czechoslovakia also

experienced economic changes toward marketization, although
to a lesser degree and at a more gradual pace. The majority
of the other Eastern European nations followed the Soviet
lead and implemented limited economic reform toward market
socialism.

They generally felt that socialism could be

maintained with slight modifications, and favored gradual
reform.89
Ironically, such national reform efforts inspired by
Gorbachev within the bloc nations aided in the demise of
Comecon.

Because the various reform efforts were

uncoordinated they differed substantially across the bloc
countries.

As a result, disharmony replaced the

historically uniform foreign trade sectors of its members.
This uniformity was necessary for the effective functioning
of Comecon trading and consequently, intra-Comecon trade
became even less efficient.
Motivated by these national economic reforms and their

89Jeffrey Sachs, "Poland and Eastern Europe: What Is To Be
Done?" in Foreign Economic Liberalization, eds. Andras Koves
and Paul Marer (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 236-237.
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impairment of effective Gomecon relations, the Forty-third
Council Session, held in 1987, proposed a parallel reform
program for Comecon.

This program included provisions for

radical reform of the policies, instruments, and
institutions of Comecon.

Most interesting was the fact that

the Soviet Union, in an apparent reversal of policy, was the
strongest proponent of this program.
Reforms suggested by the majority of its members, most
notably the Soviet Union, included a broadly-agreed goal of
revising key mechanisms of planning, monetary, and financial
cooperation.

Despite the broad agreement for the necessity

of such reforms, members could not agree on a number of
economic issues related to the specifics of designing and
implementing such changes.

Controversy focused on the

critical issues of limited regional currency convertibility,
a revised price-setting mechanism, and the specific role of
capital movements within Comecon.90
Progress toward resolving these controversies was
achieved at the Comecon Session in January 1990.

Here three

market reforms intended to improve Comecon efficiency were
agreed upon and officially adopted.

These reforms included

measures to conduct trade in convertible currency beginning
in 1991, and a revision of the cooperation system to be
90U.N. Bureau of Economic Affairs, World Economic Survey,
1988 (NY: U.N. Publications, 1988), 118.

40

prepared.91

The third reform which called for the

application of world prices to Comecon trade without
traditional time lags would do away with the "Moscow
principle."

This principle had established the setting of

Comecon prices according to annual adjustments based on the
average world price of the previous five years.92 As a
result intra-Comecon trade became based on distorted prices
that had no accurate relation to world prices.
Despite general agreement for adoption of these
reforms, a minority of the Comecon members, namely Hungary,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia, instead called for the demise of
Comecon.

Although these reforms would eventually improve

the economic potentials of all the member states over the
long-term, these Eastern European nations felt that this
reform program was not enough.

Although beneficial in some

regards, these reforms would not enable Eastern Europe to
escape its historical economic dependency on the Soviet
Union.

The Soviets, on the other hand, called for the

survival of Comecon under these reforms along with a new
plan for price setting.

The new price system would require

Comecon prices to be based on current world prices and to be
91"Assessment of the Economic Situation and Reform Process in
the Soviet Union," European Economy, (December, 1990), 62.
92Martain Schrenk, The CMEA System of Trade and Payments:
Today and Tomorrow (Washington, DC: The World Bank, January
1990), 61.
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calculated according to a new accounting system utilizing
convertible currencies.
As illustrated above, the unilateral national reform
efforts in the bloc both necessitated and served to impede
efforts toward Comecon reforms which, at the time, were very
necessary for its survival.

Because each nation was at a

different stage of domestic reform and was pursuing
differing goals, the Comecon members found it difficult to
agree on a strategy for Comecon reform that was satisfactory
to all.
In the face of such strong demands for an end to
inefficient Comecon relations, the Soviet Union finally
supported financial and monetary reforms toward market
mechanisms.

Because the continuation of Comecon and its

economic ties were contingent on such radical reforms, the
Soviets acted to dramatically reverse their historic stance
to save the organization.

This historic reversal in Soviet

policy was an unsuccessful effort to save Comecon and retain
some control of Eastern Europe in the face of growing
cleavages within the bloc.

Domestic demands for reform and

independence from Soviet influence in the satellite
countries posed a major threat to the bloc and the
continuation of Comecon relations.
This attempt to save Comecon by the Soviets ended in
failure with the termination of Comecon in 1991.

The
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reforms adopted at the 1990 Council Session, including the
introduction of hard-currency trade within Comecon in 1991,
proved unsuccessful.

This hard-currency trade reform failed

primarily because of the Soviet lack of hard currency to
import food and consumer goods after selling its oil and gas
to Eastern Europe.93
The change in the Soviet position on market-based
reform within Comecon was a case of a futile effort made
much too late.

After years of historical inefficiency due

to inconvertibility, this Soviet change in policy to keep
Comecon alive was not enough.

By the time the Soviets moved

to support the reformist nations, these Eastern European
nations no longer wanted to remain in Comecon.
V.

Conclusion
Throughout its history, the leaders of the U.S.S.R.,

with the exception of Gorbachev, resisted or undermined
every attempt toward convertibility and multilateralism
within Comecon due to important political reasons.

By

allowing such reforms, the Soviet Communist Party
effectively would have been relinquishing control over the
economies of Eastern Europe.
To maintain political control of the bloc, the U.S.S.R.

93"Comecon Sets Date for Dissolution," Financial Times 20 May
1991, 2.
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retained the bilateral workings of Comecon through the use
of inconvertibility in an effort to individually bind each
of the members to the Soviet Union.

These bilateral ties

between Moscow and each of the Eastern European nations
eliminated the possible formation of strong economic ties
among the Eastern European nations which could have been
used to gain independence from Soviet control.

Through the

dependency of each nation on the Soviet economy, the Soviets
were able to utilize economic leverage through Comecon to
influence the politics of this region.

So, although

multilateral trade was more efficient, the Soviets preferred
the political gains achieved through bilateralism within
Comecon.
In addition to the economic leverage gained through
bilateralism, this method also shielded the Comecon nations
from Western trade and influence.

The economic isolation of

the bloc was an important Soviet aim to avoid Eastern
dependency on Western capitalist nations.

The political aim

of control of Eastern Europe, achieved only through the
bilateral workings of Comecon, were the ultimate ambitions
of the Soviet Union and allowed it to maintain its buffer
zone and effectively challenge the West in the Cold War.
The use of inconvertibility and the resulting
bilateralization of intra-Comecon trade allowed the Soviets
to maintain political control of the bloc.

Yet these
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methods proved to be economically inefficient and
unsustainable over time.

The Soviets, by organizing Comecon

to achieve political aims over economic efficiency, planted
the seeds of its destruction.
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